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The Second Circuit Clears the Murk of
Gorsuch and Consumers Power
from the Esopus Creek
JOHN H. PAUL*
Part I-Introduction
New York City uses a billion and a half gallons of water a day,
and there isn't a drinkable body of water within a day's walk of
City Hall. The water that New Yorkers have drunk for genera-
tions comes every day from a hundred miles away, through the
largest tunnel in the world, and is consistently among the best
municipal water supplies in the world. This system has existed
for more than a hundred years, has been nearly maintenance-free
for most of that time, and inspires reverent talk from anyone who
knows anything about it. But it isn't perfect.
For more than sixty years, the Shandaken Tunnel has drawn
water from the muddy floor of the Schoharie Reservoir, carried it
for seventeen miles under a range of hills, and deposited it into
the Esopus Creek, one of the world's best trout streams. New
York City, which owns and operates the Tunnel, has never made
any effort to protect the stream from the muddy water that the
City pours into it. Such an effort probably never occurred to any-
one other than the fishermen and neighbors who lose the Esopus
whenever the Tunnel operates, or at least never occurred to any-
one until a coalition of those people brought a civil action under
the Clean Water Act' ("CWA") to hold the City responsible for its
actions, Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc., v.
City of New York. 2
This action probably could not have succeeded had it been
brought much earlier, but the legal terrain had just undergone a
significant change. The plaintiffs in Catskill brought their action
the same year the United States Supreme Court decided two cases
that seriously limited the law of judicial deference to an adminis-
* J.D., Pace University School of Law, 2003.
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
2. 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001), remanded to 207 F. Supp. 2d 3 (N.D.N.Y. Jun 27,
2002).
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tration's interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term. Since
1982, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") had been af-
forded judicial deference to its interpretation of "discharge of pol-
lutants" under the Clean Water Act-an interpretation
suggesting that the release of one impounded navigable water into
another could not be a discharge, and so could not trigger the
CWA's requirement of a permit for such a release. In 2000, two of
the Supreme Court's decisions put EPA's interpretation on a much
different footing with courts, and led to the Catskill plaintiffs'
success.
This casenote will discuss the statutes and cases bearing on
the Second Circuit's decision of Catskill, and will examine Catskill
to determine its reliability as authority for subsequent cases. Spe-
cifically, Part II will discuss the statutes and cases laying the
foundation of the Catskill decision, addressing the law of judicial
deference to administrative interpretation, and the meaning of
"discharge of pollutants" under the CWA. Part III will discuss the
facts, holding, and analysis of the Second Circuit's decision of Cat-
skill. Part IV will contain a critical analysis of Catskill, identify-
ing points of attack on it, and examining its solidity as authority.
Part V concludes that Catskill is both sound authority and a fair
summary of the law at the time of its decision. Part VI summa-
rizes the outcome of the Catskill litigation and recent develop-
ments in a similar case in the Eleventh Circuit.
Part II-Statutes and Cases Pertaining to Catskill
A. Statutory Authority Bearing on Catskill
1. The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act ("CWA") is an ambitious and complex
statute that states as its goal the restoration and maintenance of
the "chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters. ''3 Enacted in 1972, the CWA boldly proposed to eliminate
all discharges of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985. 4 It also
listed the goal of protecting waters supporting fish propagation,
and listed five policies that are for the most part aspirational chal-
lenges to states and future Congresses. 5 The breadth and mostly
unsupported sweep of the objectives section, however, should not
obscure one's view of a powerful statute that for 29 years has bal-
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
4. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
5. Id. § 1251(a).
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anced, in Judge Walker's words, "a welter of consistent and incon-
sistent goals." 6 An understanding of the Catskill case requires a
sense of the Act that its plaintiffs sought to apply in defense of the
Esopus Creek.
Section 301 contains the basic prohibition of the CWA, mak-
ing unlawful "the discharge of any pollutant by any person," "ex-
cept as in compliance with" section 301 and several other sections
of the CWA.7 Compliance with sections 402 and 404, as required
by section 301, means that anyone wanting to discharge pollu-
tants must get a permit to do so.8 Sections 402 and 404, read to-
gether with subsection 301(e), make clear that the permit system,
and consequently the enforceable prohibition of the CWA, apply
only to "point sources."9 The CWA, as a federal statute, can only
apply to the extent permissible under the Constitution, and in
particular its authority derives from the Commerce Clause.10 It is
therefore limited to regulating navigable waters. While specific
enumerations of its elements vary, the CWA prohibits, in sum: 1)
discharge of, 2) a pollutant, 3) from a point source, 4) to navigable
waters, 5) without a permit.1
The general definitions in section 502 are crucial to under-
standing the CWA's application to any particular circumstance.
Section 502 illuminates the first four of the above elements, listing
examples for point sources and pollutants, 12 defining navigable
waters as "waters of the United States,"13 and, most pertinently to
this casenote, defining discharge as "any addition.' 4
Section 309 outlines the methods for official enforcement of
the CWA.' 5 Against permit violators or unpermitted dischargers
of pollutants, EPA or a state with an approved permitting pro-
gram can institute administrative penalties and orders, civil ac-
tions seeking legal and equitable remedies, or criminal actions in
cases of at least negligent violations of enumerated CWA sec-
6. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481, 494 (2d Cir. 2001).
7. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000).
8. Id. §§ 1342, 1344.
9. Id. §§ 1342, 1344, 1311(e).
10. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001).
11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12) (2000).
12. Id. § 1362(14) (defining "point source"); Id. § 1362(6) (defining "pollutant").
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
14. Id. § 1362(12).
15. Id. § 1319.
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tions.16 EPA must enforce against any known violation, at least to
the extent of issuing an administrative order to comply with the
violated section of the CWA.17 While authority to enforce the CWA
lies primarily with EPA and the states, the CWA contains a provi-
sion enabling citizens to bring suit against section 402 permit vio-
lators or unpermitted dischargers, and also against EPA for
failing to perform a non-discretionary duty.18
Much of the CWA is dedicated to the National Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System ("NPDES") permitting system, 19 and
to the standards that permits are to incorporate. 20 The CWA pro-
vides for states to establish permitting programs subject to the
approval of EPA. 21 Once a state's program is approved, the state
assumes primary responsibility for issuing and enforcing per-
mits. 22 When a potential discharger of pollutants applies for a
permit, either EPA or the state agency, depending on whether the
state has an approved' permitting program, writes a proposed per-
mit that is made available to the public for comment.23 After the
comment period, the agency writes and publishes a final permit
that must consider and respond to all comments received. 24 Every
permit must be renewed at least every five years. 25
The central content of NPDES permits is a set of pollutant-
specific effluent limitations, and discharge of a pollutant in excess
of the pollutant's limitation in a permit is a permit violation. Each
limitation is written to accord with published standards.26 These
standards are broken into two categories: technology-based stan-
dards and water-quality based standards.27 EPA promulgates
technology-based standards in nationwide regulations that are
categorized by industry.28 For each industry, the standards limit
discharge of pollutants based on the best technology available for
removal of those pollutants from the industry's effluent. 29 Stricter
16. Id.
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (2000).
18. Id. § 1365.
19. Id. § 1342.
20. Id. §§ 1312-1317.
21. Id. § 1342(b).
22. Id. § 1342(c).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(2)(B)(3) (2000).
24. 40 C.F. R. § 124.17 (2003).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B).
26. Id. § 1342(a).
27. Id. §§ 1311, 1313.
28. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314(b)(2)(A) (2000).
29. Id. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314(b)(2)(A).
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standards apply to new facilities in each industry, waste treat-
ment being cheaper and more effective when the facility is de-
signed and built with certain waste treatment systems in mind. 30
As new facilities replace older ones in the industry, the average of
the best available treatment technology will therefore improve,
and over time standards will approach zero discharge of
pollutants.
Water-quality based standards are promulgated by each
state, rather than the EPA, and are specific to each waterbody in
the state, with no regard to the nature of industries potentially
discharging pollutants into that waterbody. 31  For each
waterbody, states designate a category of use, ranging from drink-
able waters to waters one should not touch; each use category en-
tails specific limitations on the amount of any pollutant in such
water.3 2 The permits written to all dischargers of pollutants into
a waterbody should in theory allocate discharge limitations among
the dischargers so that the waterbody will not exceed levels of pol-
lutants specific to its designated use.33
All of the above standards, whether technology-based or
water-quality based, are promulgated only after public notice and
comment.3 4 When a permit is written, the effluent limitations it
contains will comply with the more stringent of either the technol-
ogy-based or water-quality based standards specifically applicable
to the discharger and the waterbody.35
B. Case law bearing on the Catskill decision.
1. Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of
an Ambiguous Statute
Catskill and its brethren mark a change in courts' interpreta-
tions of "addition" of pollutants under the CWA. This is due
largely to recent decisions in the United States Supreme Court
regarding the amount of deference that courts owe to administra-
tive statements of policy and statutory interpretation. 36 As we
shall see, the Court's recently refined reading of the law on this
30. Id. § 1316(b)(1)(B).
31. See generally id. § 1313.
32. Id. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
33. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2000).
35. Id. § 1342(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)(A).
36. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576 (2000).
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point has allowed a level of judicial inquiry once thought to be
precluded.
The Court erected the landmark case in the law of judicial
deference to agency interpretation in 1984, when it decided Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.37 The
Chevron Court established that where a "statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific issue [under review], the ques-
tion for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute."38 To determine permissi-
bility, courts should decide whether the statute's silence or ambi-
guity represents an explicit or implicit delegation of authority to
the agency to elucidate that issue.39 An explicit statutory gap "is
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a spe-
cific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regu-
lations are given controlling weight [in courts] unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. '40 An
implicit statutory gap likewise delegates authority to the agency
to interpret the statute, and "a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpreta-
tion made by the administrator of an agency."41 This high level of
deference to agency interpretations has come to be known simply
as "Chevron deference."
Chevron involved a challenge by the Natural Resources De-
fense Council ("NRDC") to EPA regulations allowing certain
states, in their implementation of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 to
define a "stationary source[ ]",43 as an entire plant, possibly encom-
passing several discrete points of emission. 44 The consequence of
this policy was that a plant might install new "pollution-emitting
devices" 45 that did not individually conform to new source air
quality standards, so long as the plant as a whole met its permit-
ted emission limits. 46 After examining several sections of the
CAA, the Court found the definition of "stationary source" ambig-
37. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
38. Id. at 843.
39. Id. at 843-44.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 844.
42. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
43. Id. § 7502(c)(5).
44. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840; 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (2002).
45. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839-40.
46. Id.
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uous,4 7 and so addressed the issue of whether EPA's regulation
was "based on a reasonable construction of the statutory term 'sta-
tionary source."' 48 The Court concluded that: "the [EPA's] inter-
pretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly
competing interests and is entitled to deference. . ...,49
In 2000, the Court decided two cases that conclusively limited
the range of cases warranting Chevron deference. Before 2000,
courts had recognized that not all forms of agency statements de-
manded absolute deference, and attempted to itemize elements of
agency action that supported varying degrees of judicial defer-
ence.50 The Court reined in and formalized this imprecise body of
law first in Christensen v. Harris County,51 and then in United
States v. Mead Corp.52
Christensen announced that administrative constructions of a
statute such as those contained in opinion letters, policy state-
ments, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines lack the force
of law and do not warrant Chevron deference. 53 The Court sug-
gested that the "force of law" necessary to invoke Chevron derives
from formal APA-like procedures5 4 and delegated law-making
powers. 55 Agency statements carrying less than the necessary
force of law "are 'entitled to respect'.., but only to the extent that
those interpretations have the 'power to persuade."' 56 This re-
spect accorded to persuasive agency interpretation is commonly
47. See id. at 861 ("we are not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text
of the statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress.").
48. Id. at 840.
49. Id.
50. Both before and after Chevron, courts gauged several factors, including con-
sistency of interpretation, the care taken in formulating an interpretation, and the
agency's expertise, in determining what deference was due an administrative state-
ment of interpretation. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417
(1993) (considering consistency); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples' Util.
Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984) (considering expertise); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (considering care).
51. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
52. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
53. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
54. Id. at 587 ("Here, however, we confront an interpretation contained in an
opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice
and comment rulemaking.").
55. Id. ("[I]nterpretative rules and enforcement guidelines are 'not entitled to the
same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of the Secretary's delegated
lawmaking powers."' (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991))).
56. Id. at 587 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
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referred to as Skidmore deference, after the case that formulated
the standard. 57
In Christensen, deputy sheriffs objected to the Harris County,
Texas, Sheriffs policy of forcing deputies to take time off from
work to redeem compensatory time that they had earned by work-
ing in excess of forty hours a week; such crediting of compensatory
time is mandatory under the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"). 58 Prior to adopting this policy, the county had written
to the Department of Labor asking whether the Department
thought the policy was permissible.5 9 In an Opinion Letter, the
Department of Labor responded that its position was that the pol-
icy was permissible if the deputies were informed of, and agreed
to, the policy when they accepted overtime work.60 Before the Su-
preme Court, the deputies argued that the Opinion Letter was en-
titled to Chevron deference, seeking to avoid the Court's
conclusion that the FLSA itself did not prohibit the county's pol-
icy.61 If the Court had deferred to the Opinion Letter, the Letter's
provision that prior agreement was necessary would have bene-
fited the deputies.
The Court held that the Opinion Letter's interpretation did
not command deference as an agency interpretation lacking the
force of law.62 Deference would have been due to the Department
of Labor's regulations, following Chevron, but in this case the De-
partment's regulations did not speak directly to the issue.63 This
last point, raised by the United States as amicus curiae in the
case, highlights an important feature of the law of judicial defer-
ence to administrative interpretation. An agency's interpretation
of its own ambiguous term in a regulation does command defer-
ence in a court; this is so even when the interpretation does not
carry the force of law.6 4 Chevron, Christensen, and Mead apply to
administrative construction of a statutory term that the adminis-
tration is charged with enforcing-not to the administrative con-
struction of regulatory terms promulgated in that enforcement.
57. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
58. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
59. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 580.
60. Id. at 580; Opinion Letter from Department of Labor, Wage & Hour Division,
1992 WL 845100 (Sept. 14, 1992).
61. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586.
62. Id. at 587.
63. Id. at 587-88.
64. This deference is known as Auer deference, after Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452 (1997). See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587-88.
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As we shall see below, the Second Circuit relies principally on
Christensen in determining whether deference is due to EPA's in-
terpretation of 'addition' under the CWA in Catskill. The Catskill
court does, however, cite Mead;65 Mead is also a more complete
discussion of the law of deference to agency interpretations.
In an eight-to-one ruling, the Mead Court held that "adminis-
trative implementation of a particular statutory provision quali-
fies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carry-
ing the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."66
The Court went on to observe that such a delegation of authority
may be identified in the agency's power to conduct adjudications
or notice and comment rulemaking, "or by some other indication of
a comparable congressional intent."67 Mead also gives Skidmore a
hearty slap on the back by noting that even administrative inter-
pretations that do not "bind judges to follow them . . . certainly
may influence the courts facing questions the agencies have al-
ready answered."68
The Mead Corporation imported day planners into the United
States.69 Empowered by 19 U.S.C. § 1500(b) to do so, the U.S.
Customs Service classified Mead's day planners as "bound dia-
ries," and thereby subjected the planners to a four percent tariff.70
Customs' classifications of imports take the form of Ruling Let-
ters; these letters are binding only on the transaction at issue, are
not subject to public notice and comment, may be modified with-
out notice to anyone but the addressee, and should not be relied on
by anyone but the addressee. 71 Mead challenged Customs' inter-
pretation of "bound diaries" as including day planners. 72 Customs
65. See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York,
273 F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2001).
66. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. A careful reader will notice that the word 'gener-
ally' has replaced Chevron's "explicit or implicit" categories of delegation. The Mead
Court backs away from Chevron's distinction, looking instead for Congress's intent
that the agency "be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in
the statute or fills a space in the enacted law." Id. at 229.
67. Id. at 277.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 244.
70. Id. at 254-55.
71. Mead, 533 U.S. at 223-24; see also 19 C.F.R. §§ 177.9(a)-(c) (2003); 19 U.S.C.
§ 1625(a) (2000).
72. Mead, 533 U.S. at 255.
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invoked Chevron, raising the issue before the Court of whether the
Ruling Letter deserved judicial deference. 73
The Court held that the Letter did not warrant Chevron def-
erence, because both Customs' delegated authority to make rul-
ings and its practice in making them fell short of a delegation to
make rules carrying the force of law.74 In particular, the Court
noted that there was no notice and comment process in the rul-
ings' creation, nor "any other circumstances reasonably sug-
gesting that Congress ever thought of classification rulings as
deserving the deference claimed for them here."7 5
The law that takes shape in these three cases, Chevron,
Christensen, and Mead, can be stated with some assurance.
Courts may not set aside an agency interpretation or construction
of an ambiguous statutory term, once it appears that the agency
interpretation carries the force of law and is the result of a con-
gressional delegation to the agency to make rules of such force.
While the Supreme Court avoids a direct equation of the requisite
force of law with rulings promulgated, or adjudications conducted,
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 76 APA re-
quirements are a fair test of whether an agency action will be af-
forded deference. In particular, public notice and comment prior
to a ruling's finalization is a reliable hallmark of later deference in
judicial review of the agency's action based on that ruling.
It is also important to note that Christensen and Mead do not
invalidate Chevron's holding at all. They merely limit its applica-
tion to circumstances meeting the criteria present in Chevron it-
self. As Justice Souter noted in Mead, "Chevron . . . is a good
example showing when Chevron deference is warranted, while
[Mead] is a good case showing when it is not. '77 Following Chev-
ron, Christensen, and Mead, Catskill is also a good case showing
when deference is not warranted by an administrative interpreta-
tion of an ambiguous statutory term.
2. The Meaning of Addition
a. Gorsuch and Consumers Power
Until recently, two circuit court opinions suggested that a
transfer of pollutants between waterbodies, through a man-made
73. Id. at 225-26.
74. Id. at 231-32.
75. Id. at 231.
76. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000).
77. Mead, 533 U.S. at 237 n.18.
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structure, was not an addition of pollutants under the CWA. How-
ever, three recent circuit court decisions, including Catskill, have
come to the conclusion that such a transfer of pollutants is in fact
an addition requiring a permit under the CWA. This rather ab-
rupt change in consensus is due primarily to the change in stan-
dards of judicial deference to agency interpretation of a statute, as
outlined above. This section will examine National Wildlife Fed-
eration v. Gorsuch,78 National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers
Power Co.,79 Dubois v. United States Department of Agriculture,80
and, briefly, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. South Flor-
ida Water Management District,8 ' to establish the context into
which Catskill fits.
The D.C. Circuit decided Gorsuch in 1982, two years before
Chevron laid the foundation for modern rules of judicial deference
to agency policies. Gorsuch applied the extant law at the time,
holding that courts must give great deference to the interpretation
given an ambiguous statute by the officers or agency charged with
its administration.8 2 Under such deference, "[t]he agency's con-
struction must be upheld if ... it is 'sufficiently reasonable,' even
if it is not 'the only reasonable one or even the reading. the court
would have reached."'8 3 The D.C. Circuit stated that whether an
interpretation truly qualified for such a high degree of deference
could be determined by examining six characteristics of the
agency's formation of that interpretation.8 4 The court enumerated
these considerations as whether: 1) the agency was meant to have
substantial discretion in administering the statute, as well as in
defining its terms; 2) the agency made its interpretation contem-
poraneously with the passage of the statute; 3) the agency has
consistently adhered to that interpretation; 4) construction of the
statute is likely to require agency expertise; 5) Congress acqui-
esced to the agency interpretation by not amending the statute;
and 6) the agency's reasoning was thorough. 5 This list represents
a summary of courts' approach to determining deference before
78. 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
79. 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
80. 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996).
81. 280 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2002).
82. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 166.
83. Id. at 171 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981)).
84. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 169.
85. Id.
11
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Chevron.8 6 Depending on how well each of these considerations
was met by the agency interpretation, the Gorsuch court went on
to say, deference could be "reduced," and the actual degree of def-
erence applied would be the result of case-specific evaluation of
the agency's interpretation.8 7 One is left to wonder what less-
than-complete deference really means-at what point is partial
deference the same as the usual business of courts, weighing an
argument?
In Gorsuch, the National Wildlife Federation ("NWF")
brought a CWA citizen suit claiming that EPA has a non-discre-
tionary duty to require dam operators to secure NPDES permits.88
In internal reports, a report to Congress, letters, and its briefs to
the D.C. Circuit, EPA had taken the position that dam releases
into downstream receiving waters do not constitute the 'addition'
of pollutants, and that dams are non-point sources rather than
point sources.8 9 NWF's challenge depended solely on the issue of
"whether certain dam-induced water quality changes constitute
the [addition of a pollutant under the CWA]."90 Resolution of this
question involved, of course, the sub-issue of whether EPA's inter-
pretation of 'addition' reasonably excluded dam releases, thereby
warranting deference. 91
The Gorsuch court concluded that in light of the above six con-
siderations, and EPA's expertise in particular, EPA's interpreta-
tion of 'addition from a point source' merited deference if
reasonable. 92 The court then assessed the reasonableness of
EPA's interpretation, based on a statutory analysis of the CWA
§ 301 elements. Regarding the elements of 'addition from a point
source,' the court found that "the language of the statute permits
either [NWF's or EPA's] construction;"93 if either was permissible,
then EPA's position was reasonable and so commanded the court's
deference.
86. See id. at 167 (discussing congressional delegation of administrative author-
ity), 167 nn.31-33 (citing cases regarding consistency, contemporaneous construction,
expertise, and congressional acquiescence), 168-69 (discussing thoroughness of inter-
pretation).
87. See id. at 169-70.
88. See id. at 165 n.25.
89. See Gorsuch, at 164 n.21 (EPA 1973 Dam Report), 165 nn.26-27 (EPA Brief,
EPA Reply Brief), 167 n.33 (EPA 1977 Report to Congress), 168 n.36 (Letter), 169
n.38 (Letter).
90. See id. at 161.
91. Id. at 161.
92. Id. at 170.
93. Id. at 175.
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NWF argued that dams cause pollutants to enter reservoir
waters, and conceded that such entry is from non-point sources.94
Polluted water then passes through the dam and is thereby added
to the receiving water from the point source of the reservoir outlet
in the dam.9 5 EPA argued, as the court recited:
[A]ddition from a point source occurs only if the point source
itself physically introduces a pollutant into water from the
outside world. In [EPA's] view, the point or nonpoint character
of pollution is established when the pollution first enters navi-
gable water, and does not change when the polluted water later
passes through the dam from one body of navigable water (the
reservoir) to another (the downstream river).96
EPA's reasoning in this argument is flawed, and arguably un-
reasonable, but the court accepted it without comment. The flaw
lies in the characterization of 'pollution' as either 'point' or
'nonpoint.' These categories, however, apply to the source of pollu-
tion, not the pollution itself.9 7 The court acknowledges this dis-
tinction, but in the context of its misguided discussion of "from" a
point source as a distinct element of the CWA. EPA had argued
that reservoir pollutants pass through, rather than being dis-
charged from the point source of a dam.9 8 The court refuted this
argument by noting its inconsistency with EPA's regulations de-
fining "discharge of a pollutant" to include "surface runoff which is
collected or channeled by man."99 "Thus, [the court pointed out,]
EPA regulates the channel as a point source even though pollu-
tants merely pass through it from land to navigable water."100
Pollutants from a nonpoint source in one instance are discharged
94. Id. at 174. Gorsuch discusses in detail the nature of water quality changes
that dams cause in reservoirs, including stratification of the reservoir into cold and
warm layers, anoxia, and supersaturation. See generally Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 156.
Because these are effects of the dam's manipulation of water rather than substances
introduced to the reservoir, the parties and the court accepted them as deriving from
nonpoint sources. See id. at 161-65. Whether these water quality changes are pollu-
tants added from a point source when they pass through the dam was the inquiry
before the court. See id. at 165.
95. Id. at 174.
96. Id. at 175.
97. CWA § 301(a) prohibits discharge of a pollutant except in compliance with sec-
tions 301, 302, 306, 307, 318, 402, and 404. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000). Section 301
then prescribes timetables for the promulgation of effluent limitations for "point
sources" exclusively-not for point or nonpoint pollution. See id. § 1311(b).
98. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175 n.58.
99. Id. at 175 n.58 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (1981) (internal citations omitted)).
100. Id.
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into waters when they pass through a point source, under EPA's
own regulations. It seems unreasonable to suggest that on this
occasion pollutants from a nonpoint source retain the characteris-
tic of their nonpoint provenance and so are not discharged.
Notwithstanding this fumble in the court's treatment of
EPA's argument, it is important to note that in Gorsuch the court
does not rule, per se, that dam releases are not an addition of pol-
lutants to receiving waters. Rather, the D.C. Circuit found NWF's
and EPA's arguments to be equally permissible under the court's
reading of the CWA. The pre-Chevron, pre-Christensen law of def-
erence that the Gorsuch court applied dictated that in such a cir-
cumstance, EPA's argument commanded deference, and EPA
carried the day. The Sixth Circuit reinforced this blow to environ-
mental litigants in Consumers Power in 1988, after Chevron but
before Christensen.
The Sixth Circuit in Consumers Power followed Chevron in
assessing whether EPA's construction of the CWA was permissi-
ble, and accordingly announced that it would defer to any reasona-
ble interpretation held by EPA. 10 1 Perhaps because of the novelty
of the Chevron standard, or perhaps because the Sixth Circuit
wanted to add value to the Gorsuch decision, the Consumers
Power court conducted a more searching inquiry of EPA's position
than was necessary to find it reasonable and permissible.
As in Gorsuch, Consumers Power was a citizen suit brought
by the National Wildlife Federation. 10 2 Consumers Power Com-
pany owned and operated a hydro-electric facility in Ludington, on
the Eastern Shore of Lake Michigan. This facility operates by
pumping water to a reservoir 400 feet above the level of Lake
Michigan during hours of low-cost electricity, allowing the water
to drive turbine generators on its return to the Lake during peak
hours. 0 3 The reservoir is manmade, with a capacity of 27 billion
gallons of water, and is fed by six penstocks, which are enormous
tunnels between the pump/turbines and the reservoir.1 0 4 When
the pumps are drawing water, and again when the returning
water drives the turbines, fish and other aquatic life are drawn
through the pumps. 0 5 Predictably, many of these fish are killed
101. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir.
1988).
102. Id. at 581.
103. Id. at 581-82.
104. Id. at 581.
105. Id. at 582.
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and chopped up by the pumps, and released into Lake Michi-
gan.10 6 NWF claimed that Consumers Power's release of these
dead and hacked up fish is an addition of pollutants to Lake Mich-
igan, requiring a NPDES permit under the CWA. The court iso-
lated the issue to be whether Consumers Power's release of water
containing dead fish and fish parts was an 'addition' under the
CWA. 0 7
EPA argued as amicus curiae in support of Consumers Power
that an 'addition' of a pollutant requires the physical introduction
of that pollutant "from the outside world." 08 The court accepted
this interpretation of 'addition' as permissible and deferred to
EPA's position, stating that "the Ludington facility's movement of
pollutants already in the water is not an 'addition' of pollutants to
navigable waters of the United States."10 9 To arrive at this hold-
ing, the court hewed close to Gorsuch, following Gorsuch's reason-
ing on judicial deference even though it was outdated, and also
digressing into extensive dicta in which the court seems to confuse
the elements of 'addition' and 'point source."'10 To a degree, per-
haps unnecessary in determining the reasonableness of EPA's po-
sition, the court averred that Consumers Power and Gorsuch were
closely analogous."'
By staking its holding so much on Gorsuch, the Sixth Circuit
weakened its opinion. First, the Consumers Power court cited pri-
marily to EPA's position statements in Gorsuch, rather than any
introduced anew before the court. As we shall see, this leaves
Consumers Power vulnerable to the same weaknesses as Gorsuch
in a post-Christensen world-namely, that EPA's position state-
ments do not carry the force of law. Second, the court's argument
that dams are to be regulated as nonpoint sources under the CWA,
in addition to being irrelevant to its 'addition' analysis, does not
even pass the straight-face test. While the dam reservoirs at issue
in Gorsuch credibly do become polluted through nonpoint sources
106. Id. at 582.
107. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 584.
108. See id. at 583-84 (citing Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175).
109. Id. at 581 (citing Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 174-75).
110. See id. at 587-88.
111. See id. at 590 ("In our view, the Ludington facility is a dam for purposes of the
CWA, since it is a 'structure that impounds water."' (quoting 18 C.F.R.
§ 4.30(4)(1983); § 4.50(b)(1); § 4.91(c). All are Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
regulations promulgated pursuant to authority delegated by EPA.)); Id. at 589 ("We
find no useful distinction between these facilities [the Ludington facility and the dams
at issue in Gorsuch] for purposes of interpreting section 402 of the Clean Water Act.").
15
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such as runoff and temperature stratification, giant turbines
chopping up fish are hardly the non-discrete and far-flung sources
contemplated by the CWA's nonpoint source provisions.
Together, Gorsuch and Consumers Power seemed to establish
that any pollutant created by or passing through a man-made fa-
cility was not added to the receiving water so long as the waters
upstream and downstream of the facility were in some intuitive
sense contiguous. Stressing this contiguity in finding EPA's posi-
tion reasonable, the Consumers Power court concluded that, "[tihe
water which passes through the Ludington facility never loses its
status as water of the United States."112 However, it is important
to remember that, despite the courts' in-depth analysis of both
cases, the true holding in both cases was that EPA's position-
that such releases were not 'additions' under the CWA-war-
ranted deference because it was a permissible and reasonable in-
terpretation by the agency charged with implementing the CWA.
This position was expressed solely in letters, reports, and court
briefs. After Christensen and Mead, the basis for both courts'
opinions was greatly weakened.
b. Law, Mokelumne and Dubois
Two Circuit Court cases that superficially appear analogous
to both Gorsuch and Consumers Power nevertheless find an addi-
tion of pollutants even before Christensen's clarification of the law
of judicial deference; this is due largely to the fact that EPA had
promulgated a regulation that overrode its position on dam
releases. United States v. Law1 3 and Committee to Save
Mokelumne River v. East Bay Municipal Utility District"4 both
involved unpermitted discharges of polluted water from man-
made impoundments that were part of treatment systems collect-
ing mine runoff.' 15 Neither opinion dealt expressly with the issue
of deference to the EPA policy that prevailed in Gorsuch and Con-
sumers Power."6 Both courts did cite the EPA regulation defining
112. 862 F.2d at 589.
113. 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992).
114. 13 F.3d 305 (9th Cir. 1993).
115. See Law, 979 F.2d at 978; Mokelumne, 13 F.3d at 306-07.
116. Judge Fernandez, concurring in the Mokelumne decision, felt that the im-
poundment there was analogous to Gorsuch and Consumers Power, but noted that
EPA's own determination that the dam in Mokelumne was a point source precluded
the deference granted in Gorsuch and Consumers Power. Mokelumne, 13 F.3d. at 310.
Judge Fernandez did not cite exactly which determination he was talking about; if he
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discharge of pollutants to include addition of surface runoff waters
collected or channeled by man. 117
Rather than acknowledging that EPA had two policies, one of
which outranked the other, both courts adopted the gnarled logic
of Gorsuch and Consumers Power. In those cases, EPA's position
stated that 'addition' requires introduction of a pollutant from the
outside world, and the outside world must mean the world outside
of the navigable waters of the United States. So, there is no 'addi-
tion' of a pollutant when impoundment facilities "pass" polluted
waters from "one body of navigable water.., to another.. , To
find 'addition' in Law and Mokelumne, both courts had to deter-
mine that the impounded waters were not waters of the United
States.1 19 Once this was demonstrated, release of these waters to
waters of the U.S. was plainly an addition from the outside world,
requiring a CWA permit.
Without acknowledging this heritage of reasoning, the First
Circuit took a step further from Gorsuch and Consumers Power.
In Dubois v. United States Department of Agriculture, the court
held that the transfer of water between two distinct waters of the
United States is an 'addition' for the purposes of the CWA.1 20 The
court was able to entirely avoid the issues of judicial deference to
agency interpretation because of the procedural nature of the
case; the plaintiffs brought the case under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act ("APA") as a judicial review of the issuance of a permit
by the U.S. Forest Service ("USFS") to ski slope operators seeking
to expand their facility in the White Mountain National Forest.1 21
The complaint claimed in part that issuance of the permit without
the permitee's prior securing of a NPDES permit was arbitrary,
capricious, and not in accordance with the law. Because the USFS
is not the agency charged with enforcing the CWA, Chevron defer-
ence analysis did not apply.' 22
was referring to 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, then he was confusing the issues of 'point source'
and 'addition.' See id.
117. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2002).
118. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175; see also Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 585-86.
119. Law does this well, by observing that the treatment system there fell within
40 C.F.R. § 122.2(g), which excludes waste treatment systems from "the waters of the
United States." Law, 979 F.2d at 979. Mokelumne, however, cites the definition of
"discharge" in 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 to support its conclusion that the impoundment there
was not navigable water. Mokelumne River, 13 F.3d at 308.
120. Dubois v. United States Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1299 (1st Cir. 1996).
121. Id. at 1283.
122. See id. at 1285 n.15. Note also that this case was decided in 1996, well before
Christensen.
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Loon Corporation, the slope operators, pumped water from
the East Branch of the Pemigewasset River uphill to Loon Pond to
supply water for snowmaking equipment.123 While Loon Pond
was remarkably clean, the East Branch had historically been one
of New England's most polluted rivers. 124 The plaintiffs claimed
that pumping East Branch water into Loon Pond constituted an
addition of pollutants from a point source without a permit, 'addi-
tion' being the only element contested by the parties. 125 The dis-
trict court had held that this was not an addition, reasoning that
because both the East Branch and Loon Pond are waters of the
U.S., they are two parts of a "singular entity," so that addition is a
logical impossibility. 126
The First Circuit, on the other hand, found that distinct bod-
ies of waters of the U.S. are not a "singular entity," and held that
Loon Pond and the East Branch were indeed distinct bodies of
water, making the pumping of polluted East Branch water into
Loon Pond an addition requiring a permit. 27 The court further
deflated the lower court's "singular entity" bubble by declaring
that waters pumped through pipes have left the "domain of na-
ture," "are subject to private control," and have consequently "lost
their status as waters of the United States.' 28
The USFS argued that while transfer between unrelated
waterbodies might require a permit, Loon Pond and the East
Branch were related by their hydrological connection-Loon Pond
drains into the East Branch. This, the USFS contended, negated
the element of addition. 29 The court responded to this argument
and to the district court's singular entity theory with a point that,
remarkably, had not arisen in any of the prior cases discussed
here. "[T]he transfer of water or its contents from the East branch
to Loon Pond would not occur naturally." 30
c. Summary
When the Second Circuit decided Catskill, it faced two heavily
wrought bodies of case law. Christensen and Mead had reined in
123. Id. at 1278.
124. "It emitted an overwhelming odor and was known to peel the paint off build-
ings located on its banks." Id. at 1297.
125. Id. at 1280.
126. Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1296.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1297.
129. Id. at 1298.
130. Id. at 1297.
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Chevron, and opened up a new field of inquiry for courts address-
ing issues of 'addition' under the CWA. In short, where an admin-
istrative agency is congressionally charged with the
implementation of a statute, that agency's policies and interpreta-
tions are entitled to great respect in the courts insofar as they
carry the force of law. This force of law derives from formal, APA-
style rulemaking procedures such as public notice and comment or
agency adjudication. Agency interpretations embodied in lesser
forms such as policy memos, ruling letters, and litigation positions
are entitled to respect only to the extent that they are persuasive.
While Gorsuch and Consumers Power had seemed to hold that
the transfer of water between two bodies of waters of the United
States cannot constitute an 'addition' of pollutants to the receiving
water, these holdings were iterations of EPA's policy that dam re-
leases are not additions under the CWA, a policy the courts be-
lieved commanded deference. 131 After Christensen and Mead, this
policy turns out to warrant only the respect that persuasion mer-
its, as it is embodied chiefly in internal reports, letters, and court
briefs. And no court unconstrained by deference has given EPA's
position much respect; releases of polluted water into distinct bod-
ies of cleaner water have been held to be additions requiring
NPDES permits every time. Central to these courts' analyses,
however, is a point raised by EPA in its definition of 'addition.'
Addition must be a physical introduction from the outside world.
The outside world may include waters designated by regulation as
sources of pollution; the outside world might also include dis-
tinctly separate bodies of navigable water. Separateness might be
shown by the unlikelihood that one waterbody would ever natu-
rally receive water from another.
Part III. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Unlimited v. City of New York
The majority of New York City's water comes from the Cat-
skill Mountain Range, via either of two aqueducts: the Delaware
Aqueduct or the Catskill Aqueduct. These aqueducts transport
water from two sets of watersheds in the Catskills to the east side
of the Hudson River, emptying there into reservoirs, from which
the water again travels by aqueduct to the City. For more than
sixty years the City has operated the Shandaken Tunnel, which
carries water from the Schoharie Reservoir south to the Esopus
131. See Consumers Power, 862 F.2d 580; Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156.
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Creek, which in turn empties into the Ashokan Reservoir. Water
from the Schoharie naturally drains north, down the northern
slopes of the Catskills into the Mohawk River, which empties into
the Hudson River. Because both the Mohawk and the Hudson are
too polluted to drink, the only way for the City to avail itself of the
potable water in the Schoharie was to tunnel under the mountains
that separate the Schoharie from the Esopus Creek.
For a variety of reasons, the water in the Schoharie Reservoir
often has a high content of suspended silt particles. In other
words, it is muddy. The Esopus Creek, while subject to its own
muddy spells, flows clear and cold much more often than the wa-
ters of the Schoharie watershed. The Esopus has traditionally
been a premier trout fishery, drawing sport fishermen from all
over the world. The Shandaken Tunnel empties into the Esopus
via a spillway-a broad, flat concrete pad. Where the Tunnel
empties into the Esopus, the Esopus abruptly changes from clear
to an opaque reddish-brown, earning the Esopus the nickname
"Yoohoo Creek" after the chocolate drink. The Esopus is then
muddy and brown for the rest of its course to the Ashokan
Reservoir.
The City has never treated the water flowing through the
Shandaken Tunnel because the series of reservoirs between the
Shandaken and the City act as a natural treatment system, where
the silt eventually settles out. The Esopus, however, receives and
carries all the silt from the Shandaken. As a result, the Esopus's
quality suffers greatly; it cannot sustain a trout fishery down-
stream of the Tunnel. Not only does the silt make the Esopus un-
attractively turbid and unsafe for wading fishermen, but it also
impairs trout's ability to see both prey and fishing lures. Moreo-
ver, the Schoharie Reservoir stratifies during the summer into a
cold layer of water on the bottom of the reservoir, and a warm
layer on top. By the end of the summer, the lower layer has usu-
ally been drawn out, and only trout-repellent warm water passes
through the Shandaken tunnel into the Esopus.
In 2000, five plaintiffs filed a Clean Water Act citizen suit
against the City in federal district court, claiming that the
Shandaken's discharge into the Esopus Creek is an unpermitted
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters of the U.S. from a
point source. 13 2 The complaint further alleged that because of the
132. The five plaintiffs were: Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc.,
Theodore Gordon Flyfishers, Inc., Catskill-Delaware Natural Water Alliance, Inc.,
Federated Sportsmen's Clubs of Ulster County, Inc., and Riverkeeper, Inc. See Cat-
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discharge, the Esopus exceeded New York State water quality
standards for turbidity and temperature. 13 3 The City responded
with two motions to dismiss: first, under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction,1 3 4 and second,
under FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, on the grounds
that the Shandaken does not "discharge" pollutants into the Eso-
pus within the meaning of the CWA. The district court granted
the City's motion for failure to state a claim, finding as a matter of
law that the Shandaken's discharge was not an "addition.' 35
Before the Second Circuit, the City supported its contention
that it does not add pollutants to the Esopus by citing Gorsuch
and Consumers Power.136 The Second Circuit thus became the
first appellate court to evaluate whether EPA's position on dam
releases deserved Chevron deference after Christensen and Mead.
The court held that the deference accorded in Gorsuch and Con-
sumers Power was "unjustified," because EPA's interpretation of
'addition' was "never formalized in a notice and comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. . .. "137 Citing Mead, the Second Circuit determined
that EPA's position warranted lesser (i.e.-Skidmore) deference;
that it "should be followed to the extent persuasive.' 3 The court
then announced that it did not find EPA's interpretation
persuasive. 139
skill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481
(2d Cir. 2001).
133. Id. at 486.
134. As required by the CWA citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b), Plaintiffs
had sent the City, EPA, and the New York Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion a Notice of Intent to sue ("NOI letter") in November 1998. Id. at 484. This NOI
letter notified the City of Plaintiffs' claim that the Shandaken discharged suspended
and settleable solids into the Esopus. Id. at 484. Plaintiffs' complaint, however, al-
leged discharges of turbidity and heat, as well as suspended solids. Id. at 484-85.
While the district court denied the City's 12(b)(1) motion, the circuit court reversed,
holding that Plaintiffs' allegations of heat discharge were not reasonably inferable
from the suspended solids notification; the claim of heat pollution was therefore dis-
missed. Id. at 488-89. However, because turbidity is a necessary consequence of sus-
pended solids, the City was reasonably on notice of Plaintiffs' claim of turbidity.
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d
481, 488-89 (2d Cir. 2001). While there are lessons to be learned from this, and com-
pelling questions of whether the NOI letter is a jurisdictional element to a citizen suit,
these are beyond the scope of this casenote.
135. Id. at 485.
136. See id. at 489.
137. Id. at 489-90, 490 n.2.
138. Id. at 491.
139. Id.
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In its analysis of the term 'addition,' the court begins with
EPA's requirement of introduction from the outside world, and
agrees with this position "provided that 'outside world' is con-
strued as any place outside the particular water body to which
pollutants are introduced."140 The opinion then summarizes the
conclusions of Gorsuch and Consumers Power, stating that in
those cases the waters at issue were merely "recirculated," and
notes that these conclusions rest on the assumption, unanalyzed
here, that the destination waterbodies were "the same" as the
source waterbodies, so that nothing is introduced from the outside
world.141
In unhesitating language, the court then refutes the City's
argument.
The present case, however, strains past the breaking point the
assumption of "sameness" made by the Gorsuch and Consumers
Power courts. Here, water is artificially diverted from its natu-
ral course and travels several miles from the Reservoir through
Shandaken Tunnel to Esopus Creek, a body of water utterly un-
related in any relevant sense to the Schoharie Reservoir and its
watershed. No one can reasonably argue that the water in the
Reservoir and the Esopus are in any sense the "same," such that
"addition" of one to the other is a logical impossibility. When
the water and the suspended sediment therein passes from the
Tunnel into the Creek, an "addition" of a "pollutant" from a
"point source" has been made to a "navigable water," and the
terms of the statute are satisfied. 142
Note that EPA's interpretation of addition is preserved in this
logic. Artificial diversion is the introduction EPA requires, and
the "unrelated" source water is the outside world.
Part IV. Analysis of Catskill's outcome and logic.
The Catskill decision cheered many who had come to accept
Gorsuch and Consumers Power as the lay of the land; however,
potential litigants might respond more cautiously before relying
on it in future cases. To ascertain its value as precedent, of
course, one should examine whether it rests on solid ground.
140. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481, 491 (2d Cir. 2001).
141. Id. at 491-92 n.3 ("We need not and do not decide whether those courts were
correct in accepting that the source and destination waters were identical and thus
whether we would reach their conclusions if presented with the same facts.").
142. Id. at 492.
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1. Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations
Catskill correctly applied the law of judicial deference to
agency policies. In a case involving a formally promulgated regu-
lation, Chevron displaced a multi-faceted inquiry designed to en-
sure a well-reasoned agency interpretation, with a more
generalized inquiry based on finding congressional intent that the
agency be charged with forming the interpretation. Subsequent
decisions misread Chevron, however, to grant deference even to
informal agency expression. Christensen and Mead restored logic
to Chevron.
EPA's interpretation of addition as articulated in Gorsuch,
and as denied deference by Catskill, took shape in very informal
ways. 143 Indeed, a less formally adopted position could hardly re-
quest judicial deference in good faith. Given the statements of
Christensen and Mead, Catskill had little choice but to deny defer-
ence to EPA.
The Catskill court may have overstepped existing law, how-
ever, when it seemed to limit derivation of the requisite force of
law to interpretations adopted through APA procedures.144 On
the one hand, this does seem like a good rule. The APA forces the
legislative actions of administrations into positions of accountabil-
ity through public notice and comment, and through adjudicative
procedures answerable ultimately to courts of the U.S. An admin-
istrative position adopted without procedural guarantees of ac-
countability could be authored by a single appointed official and
could affect millions of people without their representation in its
formation. Such a policy that prevailed automatically, even in the
Supreme Court, would subvert the Separation of Powers doctrine.
These considerations were undoubtedly behind the requirement
that administrative interpretations of statutes carry the force of
law before warranting judicial deference. The Mead Court, never-
theless, rather pointedly stopped short of designating APA proce-
dures as the sole indicator of a policy's force of law. The Second
Circuit seems to recognize this by speaking more generally about
143. As noted above, the Gorsuch court cites most often to EPA's court briefs,
which are drafted by Department of Justice attorneys, not the administrative experts
imagined by the Chevron Court. To say that an agency position composed largely of
the agency's litigation position is entitled to deference, unless unreasonable, is essen-
tially to say that the agency cannot lose in court.
144. "[EPA's] position was never formalized in a notice and comment rulemaking
or formal adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act. . . ." Catskill Moun-
tains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir.
2001).
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"indicia" justifying Chevron deference, after noting EPA's failure
to follow APA procedures. 145 However, the Catskill court's early
equation of APA procedures with the force of law necessary to
command judicial deference should not be relied upon too heavily.
Having rebutted the argument that EPA's position warranted
Chevron deference, Catskill then claims to accord the EPA posi-
tion what has been called Skidmore deference, saying that "the
agency position should be followed to the extent persuasive."146
The Second Circuit inherited a less-than-precise standard of def-
erence in Skidmore, and applies it in kind. While Mead does refer
to the Skidmore standard occasionally as "deference," Mead also
uses or incorporates the words "respect," "persuasive force," and
"weight."147 Such consideration given to an argument, to the ex-
tent of its persuasiveness, hardly varies from the weight given to
any argument. Skidmore deference is in practice no more than
the normal opportunity to be heard, and the Second Circuit's nod
to it should not be taken for more than exactly that.
One might argue that this is quickly apparent in Catskill,
when the court immediately qualifies EPA's use of the term
'outside world' to mean "any place outside the particular water
body to which pollutants are introduced." 148 Far from deferring in
any real sense, the court claims to agree with EPA so long as EPA
is saying what the court wants it to say; saying anything else
would simply be unpersuasive. Given Skidmore's flaccid require-
ments, however, such an approach does not overstep any bounds.
2. The Meaning of Addition
Free, then, to interpret "addition" according to its own logic,
the court does so in a clear, logical, and applicable manner. Tak-
ing Skidmore at least so far as to start with EPA's interpretation
of addition, the court makes more sense of that interpretation
than EPA had. One should remember that the CWA's element is
145. See id. at 491 ("[A] position adopted in the course of litigation lacks the indicia
of expertise, regularity, rigorous consideration, and public scrutiny that justify Chev-
ron deference."), 490 ("If EPA's position had been adopted in a rulemaking or other
formal proceeding, deference of the sort applied by the Gorsuch and Consumers Power
courts might be appropriate.").
146. Id. at 491 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 233-37).
147. Mead, 533 U.S. at 233 (citing Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121,
136 (1997); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144,
157 (1991)).
148. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481, 491 (2d Cir. 2001).
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"discharge," defined later in the CWA as "addition."149 EPA inter-
preted "addition" to mean "physical introduction from the outside
world."150 However, EPA then defined "outside world" as "outside
the navigable waters of the U.S.," which invited the district court
in Dubois, for instance, to conclude that all waters of the U.S. are
a "single entity" such that the pumping of one uphill into another
cannot be a "discharge" within the CWA, regardless of the one's
filth and the other's purity.151
Returning to EPA's serviceable concept of "physical introduc-
tion from the outside world," Catskill reasons that one body of
water cannot be added to itself, but anything outside that body
may be. The court disagrees with "singular entity" thinking, be it
in Gorsuch or Dubois' district court, and holds itself responsible to
the "ordinary meaning of the CWA's text."'52
This approach is in accord with the First Circuit's decision in
Dubois, which was the authority most closely on point for the Cat-
skill court. Dubois had found Loon Pond and the East Branch not
to be the "same' as Catskill put it, primarily because water from
the East Branch would never flow naturally into Loon Pond. 153
Likewise, Catskill emphasized that water from the Schoharie
would never reach the Esopus Creek through natural channels.
Two waters cannot be part of the "same" body of water if artificial
diversion is necessary to make them mingle, and if one is diverted
to flow into the other, addition under the CWA occurs.
The Second Circuit also takes the trouble of aligning Catskill
with Gorsuch and Consumers Power. In those cases, the D.C. and
Sixth Circuits, respectively, had found the movements of water at
issue to be mere passage 54 or "movement or diversion," 55 implic-
itly finding the receiving and source waters to be parts of the
"same" bodies of water. Accepting these findings at face value,
Catskill accords with both Gorsuch and Consumers Power as fac-
tually distinct. Gorsuch and Consumers Power dealt with im-
pounded water released downstream; Catskill dealt with water
diverted through a tunnel to a separate watershed.
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000).
150. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165.
151. Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1296-97.
152. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481, 493 (2d Cir. 2001).
153. Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1297.
154. See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165. This characterization is made in EPA's argu-
ment to the court, to which the court ultimately defers.
155. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 589.
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This, however, raises the question of whether Catskill needed
to address Gorsuch and Consumers Power in the detail that it did.
The City invoked those cases as its primary defense, arguing that
they were analogous to Catskill and that the court should there-
fore follow their deferential conclusions to hold that as a matter of
law, the City did not add pollutants to the Esopus. 156 However, if
Catskill was distinguishable on its facts from Gorsuch and Con-
sumers Power, Catskill arguably could have formed its own inter-
pretation of addition under the circumstances and entirely
avoided the issues of whether deference to EPA was proper, and
whether EPA's interpretation was persuasive.
There are a couple of possible explanations for why the Cat-
skill court felt the need to respond in detail to the Gorsuch and
Consumers Power decisions. First, Catskill is careful to point out
that it accepts without deciding as correct Gorsuch and Consum-
ers Power's characterizations of their facts as involving contiguous
source and receiving waters. 157 If the court had genuinely
thought that those cases were decided correctly, it would not have
needed to put them at arm's length so explicitly. This suggests
that the court did not see their facts as truly distinguishable, re-
quiring it to invalidate their foundations, and so, their authority.
Second, the court may have recognized that future courts
would see an analogy in the facts that neither Gorsuch and Con-
sumers Power nor Catskill relied on. All three cases focused on
what should constitute the "outside world" for purposes of addi-
tion; in the process, they skirted the definition of "introduction"
from that outside world. The concept of introduction, however, in-
cludes an "outside world"-nothing can be introduced to itself. At
the time of this writing, one circuit court since Catskill has cen-
tered simply on finding introduction, conceived as "cause-in-fact of
... release," to satisfy the CWA element of addition.158 The Cat-
skill court may have predicted that Gorsuch, Consumers Power,
and Catskill could all be considered in this light, and thus felt the
need to undermine the previous cases' authority.
156. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481, 489 (2d Cir. 2001).
157. See id. at 492 n.3 ("We need not and do not decide whether those courts were
correct in accepting that the source and destination waters were identical and thus
whether we would reach their conclusions if presented with the same facts.").
158. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 1368
(11th Cir. 2002) ("We ... conclude that an addition from a point source occurs if a
point source is the cause-in-fact of the release of pollutants into navigable waters.").
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Part V. Conclusion
Whatever its reasons for addressing the issues of deference to
EPA and of EPA's interpretation of addition, the Second Circuit
has relegated Gorsuch and Consumers Power to the dustbins of
history. Christensen and Mead strongly suggested that the defer-
ence accorded in those cases to EPA's informally adopted interpre-
tation was improper; Catskill explicitly stated this to be so.
Because the true holdings of those cases was that EPA's interpre-
tation warranted deference, not that addition had not occurred,
Catskill's refutation of those holdings leaves no appellate court de-
cision to support the proposition that transfer of polluted water
between two navigable waterbodies is not an addition under the
CWA. Anyone promoting that proposition has only EPA's informal
interpretation as authority, and it is an interpretation formed
largely during litigation specific to Gorsuch. Arguments to the
contrary have the cogent reasoning of Dubois, Catskill, and now
Miccosukee.159
Part VI. Epilogue
Catskill has been decided on remand to the Northern District
of New York, resulting in a penalty assessment against defend-
ants of $5.7 million dollars, as well as injunctive relief for plain-
tiffs. On June 4, 2002, the Catskill plaintiffs were granted
summary judgment against defendants New York City and New
York City Department of Environmental Protection, on the issue
of whether defendants had discharged suspended solids and tur-
bidity from the Shandaken Tunnel portal without a permit. 160
Thereafter, the court held a four-day trial on the issue of civil pen-
alties and injunctive relief.161 Applying the civil penalty consider-
ations under CWA § 309(d), the court found that the City had
reasonably believed prior to the Second Circuit's decision that the
City did not need a SPDES permit for the Shandaken Tunnel dis-
charge.' 62 However, the court also found that the City had
delayed overlong in applying for a permit after the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion.' 63 Applying a "top-down" approach to penalty cal-
159. See generally id.
160. See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York,
207 F. Supp. 2d 3, 4 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
161. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 244
F. Supp. 2d 41 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
162. Id. at 54.
163. Id.
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culation, and applying the maximum per-day penalty for every
day of discharge after the defendants' reasonable delay in apply-
ing for a SPDES permit, the court subtracted "$57,500,500 from
the maximum allowable penalty to arrive at the final figure of
$5,749,000."164 Plaintiffs' attorneys believe this to be the largest
CWA penalty ever levied against a municipality.
The court also ordered the City to obtain a SPDES permit by
August 6, 2004.165 Because the permit issuing agency in New
York, the New York State Department of Environmental Conser-
vation ("DEC"), was not a party to the action at the time of trial,
the court took the step of invoking the All Writs Act1 66 to join the
DEC as a third-party defendant. 167 The DEC is ordered to process
the City's application and issue a permit within 18 months of the
decision, or report to the court on why it does not believe it can do
So. 1 6 8 In order for a permit to be issued, of course, the Shandaken
Tunnel discharge will have to meet the water quality standards
applicable to the Esopus. This may be the result that means the
most to the fishermen who originally brought the case: the Esopus
Creek may soon run as clear as it had for centuries before the City
opened the Shandaken Tunnel.
Of greater bearing on the reliability of the decisions of the
First and Second Circuits, in Dubois and Catskill respectively, is
the fate of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Miccosukee. The
South Florida Water Management District, the defendant in the
Miccosukee case, filed a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court. The question presented was whether its pumping of drain-
age water containing primarily non-point source pollutants, from
one side of a levee into the Florida Everglades, is an addition
under CWA § 402.
The Supreme Court requested the United States Solicitor
General to file an amicus brief on whether the Court should grant
certiorari, and the Solicitor General filed that brief in May of
2003.169 The Solicitor General's brief urged the Court not to grant
certiorari "because [the] fact-specific decision [of the Eleventh Cir-
164. Id.
165. Id. at 55-56.
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000).
167. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 244
F. Supp. 2d 41, 55-56 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
168. Id.
169. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Solicitor General Theodore Olson et al.,
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, No. 02-626, 71 U.S.L.W.
3320 (U.S. Oct. 21, 2002) (Petition for Certiorari).
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cuit in Miccosukee] does not give rise to a conflict among the
courts of appeals or otherwise present a question warranting this
court's review." 170
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and will
hear the Miccosukee case during its 2004 term. 17' Depending on
the scope of the Court's decision in Miccosukee, its treatment of
this issue may call into question the viability of the Catskill deci-
sion. The facts in Miccosukee are arguably distinguishable from
those of Catskill and Dubois. In Miccosukee, the division of water-
sheds is man-made-the Army Corps of Engineers having built a
series of levees and canals to shunt south-flowing waters into the
Everglades and away from subsequently developed land. 172 De-
pending on the broadness of the Court's language, the Court's pos-
sible reversal of Miccosukee might not affect the holdings in
Catskill and Dubois, where the separation of the relevant
waterbodies is geological rather than man-made. This might be a
fine line for later litigants hoping to rely on Catskill and Dubois,
but on the other hand, the facts in Miccosukee are fairly
narrow.173
The above paragraph betrays a prediction regarding the
Court's ruling. If that prediction is wrong, the Court's affirmance
of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Miccosukee would leave undis-
turbed the fact that, in the Solicitor General's words, "no court of
appeals has squarely considered and rejected the reasoning of
[Dubois and Catskill]. . ... 174 Under such an outcome, the deci-
sions of Dubois, Catskill, and Miccosukee would stand as a persua-
170. Id.
171. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 2003 WL
21472806, 71 U.S.L.W. 3320 (June 27, 2003). Note that even the Solicitor General's
brief suggests the Eleventh Circuit may have erred in Miccosukee: "[Tihe lower
court's characterization of the water control facilities at issue as creating distinct bod-
ies of water for CWA purposes may be incorrect. . . ." Brief of Amicus Curiae United
States Solicitor General Theodore Olson et al., S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Mic-
cosukee Tribe of Indians, No. 02-626, 71 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S. Oct. 21, 2002) (Petition
for Certiorari).
172. Miccosukee, 280 F.3d 1364, 1366.
173. For instance, the Solicitor General's amicus brief stopped short of suggesting
that any flaw in the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning would apply to Catskill or Dubois.
Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Solicitor General Theodore Olson et al., S. Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, No. 02-626, 71 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S.
Oct. 21, 2002) (Petition for Certiorari).
174. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States Solicitor General Theodore Olson et al.,
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, No. 02-626, 71 U.S.L.W.
3320 (U.S. Oct. 21, 2002) (Petition for Certiorari).
869
29
870 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
sive set of appellate court decisions holding the interbasin
transfer of pollutants to be an addition under the Clean ' Water
Act.
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